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Pierce: Constitutional Law: Inclusion of the Fifth Amendment Right Agains
CASE COMMENTS

throughout the United States, in all criminal prosecutions, is guaranteed the right to counsel. The Court could grant certiorari and decide
the case on grounds other than the right to counsel, which could
either weaken the current holding or abrogate it entirely. Or it
could grant certiorari and limit the Harvey rationale to "serious
crimes" based on the length of imprisonment, thereby leaving the
states some flexibility in furnishing counsel to indigents. But regardless of the ultimate disposition of Harvey, it is clear that the Fish
position is in serious jeopardy.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Harvey rejected the felonymisdemeanor classification in determining whether an indigent has
the right to counsel. The inescapable conclusion is that Harvey, unless
modified by the Supreme Court, supersedes Fish and extends the right
to counsel to defendants accused of all crimes. Although Harvey may
well result in temporary administrative chaos and a heavy financial
burden in Florida and some other states, these states have created this
situation by failing to provide fair and consistent treatment of indigent defendants. Perhaps this is the price that must be paid to
effectuate long overdue reforms in the treatment of indigents.
ROBERT L. MANLY

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INCLUSION OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
WITHIN THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Malloy v. Hogan, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489 (1964)
Petitioner was ordered to testify before a referee appointed by the
Superior Court of Hartford County, Connecticut, inquiring into alleged gambling and other criminal activities in the county. He was
questioned in connection with events surrounding his previous arrest
and conviction for the crime of pool-selling, a type of bookmaking."
1.

CONN. GEN. STAT. §53-295 (1958).
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He refused to answer on the ground of self-incrimination and was
adjudged in contempt and committed to prison. The Hartford
County Superior Court's decision denying petitioner's application for
a writ of habeas corpus was affirmed by the Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors on the ground that there was not sufficient showing
of any danger of self-incrimination.2 On certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court HELD, the fifth amendment's protection against selfincrimination is applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment and the applicable federal standards are to be applied.
Judgment reversed, Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White dissenting, Justice Douglas concurring.
The question whether the fifth amendment protection against
self-incrimination was applicable against the states first arose in
Twining v. New Jersey.3 In that case the United States Supreme
Court took the position that it was applicable only to the federal
government and not to the states. This decision left the burden on
the states to provide a protection against self-incrimination in state
proceedings. The Supreme Court in the present case refused to follow Twining stating that later decisions have departed from the
Twining view. The Court supported this conclusion with a series of
cases, 4 which it said demonstrated the trend toward extending the protection of the first eight amendments to prevent abridgment of these
rights by the states. The majority asserted that the right against selfincrimination had already been applied against the states in coerced
confession cases. As the minority pointed out, however, there had been
no indication that Twining had been overruled prior to this case.
The court had in fact reaffirmed Twining in numerous decisions,5 the
most recent being Cohen v. Hurley6 in 1961.
In rejecting the Twining position, the Court was presented with
the choice of following the doctrine developed in Palko v. Connecticut,7 which allowed the states to establish their own standards; or

going beyond Palko and requiring the states to use federal standards.
2. Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220, 187 A.2d 744 (1963).
3. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
4. E.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Brain v. United States, 168
U.S. 532 (1897); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).

5. E.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1946); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
6. 366 U.S. 117 (1961). In reference to petitioner's claim of protection against
self-incrimination in a state proceeding, the Court said: "That proposition. however.
was explicitly rejected by this Court, upon the fullest consideration, more than fifty
years ago, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, and such has been the position of the
Court ever since." Id. at 128.
7.

302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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The Court in Palko held that the double jeopardy provision of the
fifth amendment was not applicable to state prosecutions. The Court
did state, however, that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment could prevent a defendant from being twice put in jeopardy when such actions would violate the fundamental principles
of liberty and justice that underlie our system of law.3 But the Court
did not choose to limit the decision in this case to the holding in
Palko. It went on to incorporate the fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination within the fourteenth amendment, and made the
federal standards applicable against the states.
The crux of the problem in Malloy, therefore, was whether uniformity between state and federal courts is necessary to insure protection against self-incrimination. At first glance this question might be
answered in the negative, but careful consideration leads to the conclusion that the policy behind the imposition of uniformity appears
to be sound. The Court said, "It would be incongruous to have different standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based
on the same feared prosecution, depending on whether the claim
was asserted in a state or federal court." 9 The right against self-incrimination is designed for the protection of an individual asked to
testify with or without the aid of counsel. When no uniformity exists each state has its own method for invoking the privilege, and
also an entirely separate set of standards to determine whether the
claim of privilege is valid. The requirements in another state or in
the federal courts may be, and usually are, entirely different. In the
case of a layman, without counsel, he is held to know when the privilege is available to him, the applicable procedure used for invoking it,
and how much he may say without waiving it. All of these may vary
depending on the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court attempted in this
case to remove this trap for the unwary. This decision clarifies the
law in an area that was previously beset with substantial confusion
resulting from conflicting standards. The price to be paid for this
clarification and uniformity is increased federal control.
The path chosen by the Court is certainly no surprise to those
who are aware of its recent moves to guarantee the individual's rights
against state infringement. Although the Court still seemingly rejects wholesale incorporation of the protections of the Bill of Rights
into the fourteenth amendment,10 it has nevertheless taken one further step in that direction. This series of recent decisions, which
began with Gitlow v. New York,' does not seem to have reached its
8. Id. at 328.
9. 84 Sup. Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964).
10. Id. at 1491.
11. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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